Russia and Germany at War, Der Ostfront, January - December 1943

Oct 8, 2011
Michael Manning

Kursk, Red Army prisoners, 1943 - Barbarossa, Alan Clark

Germany, despite the defeat at Stalingrad was still capable of offensive action in Russia due to technical superiority in armoured vehicles and tactics.

When Soviet forces linked up at Kalach, the final shift in the strategic balance between the two adversaries commenced. From November 1942 the Wehrmacht campaign in the East was fundamentally defensive. The defeat at Stalingrad shocked the German nation. Hitler was decisive in selecting two Generals, Heinz Guderian and Erich von Manstein, as architects of the German recovery. They decided how the campaign should be fought - a reversion to the mobile defence, a war of manoeuvre, luring the enemy forward to entrap and destroy him as in Tannenberg in World War 1.

General von Manstein in Command

Manstein was ordered to travel to Army Group B, HQ, Starobyelsk on 20 November 1942. This date marked the change in the character of the German leadership. Manstein quickly pointed out that 91 Red Army divisions were committed to the siege of Stalingrad, so, he quickly arranged his Army Group formations to deal with the Soviet threat to the east.

General Balck's 11th Panzer defeated the Soviet Fifth Guards Tank Army at the Chir River on 7th December. The continued Russian build up of forces, lack of communication with Paulus and Hoth's relief force at risk of annihilation sealed 6th Army's fate. Hoth retreated on the 21st December. Hitler refused Paulus permission to break out from Stalingrad

Manstein, during the first week of January 1943, had forces in three separate groups, each so preoccupied with its own predicament to render mutual support. Army Group A ,deep in the Caucasus, was outside Manstein's direct command. Manstein's own units were concentrated around a few energetic commanders - Hollidt, Mieth, Fretter-Pico, responsible for for fronts up to 160km long.

Russian Strength Declines

Russia brought 2.5 million men into uniform since the outbreak of war. They had lost 4 million trained soldiers. There was a desperate scarcity of commanders to lead the new army. Tactical flexibility and speed in exploitation were far below German standards. Manstein had to remain as close to Stalingrad as possible but once it was abandoned he could used the Don River bend to manoeuvre. Manstein had to extricate Army Group A from the Caucasus.

Disposition of German Forces

Some 400,000 men were immobilised at the extreme southern end of the OstFront. Zhukov kept 500,000 men around Stalingrad, containing the German 6h Army. Feld Marshall Paulus surrendered his forces to the Russians on 30 January with the southern salient surrendering on 2 February 1943. 91,000 men went into Russian captivity only 6,000 returned to Germany c.1953.

Kharkov, a Defeat for the Red Army

General Guderian's reinstatement revitalised the Panzer Armoured Divisions and despite the capture of Kharkov by the Russians, Manstein was ready to retake this vital city. Manstein had thinned out his defensive screen in order to conserve his armoured forces and asembled his new Tiger tanks at the nearby railhead and struck Russian forces west of Kharkov in a giant pincer movement leaving 20,000 Russian dead, destroying 600 tanks and 350 guns and taking 10,000 prisoners.

Fall Zitadelle, the German Attack on the Kursk Salient

Manstein had intended to strike against Kursk imediately after his victory at Kharkov, an alternative attack, southeast of Kharkov, was shelved. The PzKwV Panther tank production delayed the offensive until July, when, the element of surprise was lost. The Russians prepared defences in depths of 12km over two months and met the German offensive head on.

Model's attack was repulsed in the north. Manstein's attack from the south penetrated 20km. Model's attack was called off, allowing the Red Army to destroy Hoth's 4th Panzer Army. The biggest tank battle in the history of warfare took place on 12th July 1943, with Hoth's 600 Panther and Tiger tanks colliding head on with the Soviet Fifth Army's 900 tanks, under an immense dust cloud in stifling heat over eight hours. The Red Army triumphed over a mighty German armoured offensive.

In Conclusion

The failure of Zitadelle meant the war was lost. Himmler now set about how to moderate defeat. Italy was leaving the Axis alliance. Russian armoured divisions were increasing in strength around the Kursk salient. In October 1943, the Germans were deep inside Russia but were in a steady decline. Manstein's Army Group received 33,000 replacements yet suffered 133,000 casualties. The Germans faced a dangerous, and worsening prospect.